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1 
Legislating Against Hatred:  The Law Commission’s Report on 
Hate Crime 
Introduction 
The issue of hate crime and how to tackle it has become of increasing significance over the last 
two decades, particularly in light of the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993.  Although 
incitement to racial hatred offences had been in existence under the Public Order Act 1986 
(POA),1 following Home Office consultation on racial violence and harassment in 1997,2 the 
Government introduced specific legislation to tackle racist hate crime under the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (CDA).  These offences created aggravated versions of basic offences if an 
offender was motivated by or demonstrated racial hostility.  Religion was added to the CDA 
provisions in 20013 and to the POA in 2006,4 whilst the POA provisions were further extended 
to sexual orientation in 2008.5  The CDA also introduced a sentencing provision which in its 
current form under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) requires all sentencing judges to take 
account of any hostility towards race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity as an 
aggravating feature which increases the level of punishment an offender may receive.6  Although 
opinion is divided as to whether a state should introduce targeted legislation in order to tackle 
hate crime,7 hate crime statutes now appear in many jurisdictions across the world.8    
In March 2012, the Hate Crime Action Plan was launched which sought to outline the 
Government’s strategy for reducing the levels of hate crime experienced by victims.9  
Combatting hate crime is seen as central to ensuring that as a society we ‘embrace [the] rich mix 
of different races, cultures, beliefs, attitudes and lifestyles’ that exist in Britain today.10  Effective 
legislation is at the heart of the Hate Crime Action Plan and is fundamental to its success.  With 
1 The first version of this offence can be found in the Race Relations Act 1965, section 6. 
2 Racial Violence and Harassment:  A Consultation Document, Home Office, September 1997. 
3 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, section 39. 
4 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. 
5 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
6 Sections 145 and 146. 
7 There is a rich source of commentary on this, but the two sides of the debate are exemplified very well by J Jacobs 
and K Potter, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics (OUP 1998) and F Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes 
Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999).  For UK commentators see for example P Iganski, ed., The 
Hate Debate:  Should Hate Be Punished as a Crime?  Profile Books Ltd, London, 2002; N Hall, Hate Crime (Willan 
Publishing 2005); I Hare, 'Legislating Against Hate: The Legal Response to Bias Crime' (1997) 17 OJLS 415; M 
Malik, '”Racist Crime”: Racially Aggravated Offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part II' (1999) 62 MLR 
409 and F Brennan ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998: racially motivated crime: the response of the criminal justice 
system’ Criminal Law Review, 1999, Jan, 17-28.  On hate speech, see J Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, (Harvard 
University Press, 2012); I Hare ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows:  Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’ 
Public Law (2006) 521-538; I Loveland ‘Hate Crimes and the First Amendment’ Public Law (1994) 174-183; AW 
Bradley ‘Free Expression and Acts of Racial Hatred’ Public Law (1992) 357-359; T Morton ‘Free Speech v Racial 
Aggravation’ New Law Journal  (6th August 1999)  1198;  J Cooper and AM Williams ‘Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial 
and International Human Rights Law’ European Human Rights Law Review (1999) (vol . 6) 593-613; D Pannick 
‘Religious Feelings and the European Court’ Public Law ( 1995) 7-10.   
8 See for instance, Hate Crime Laws, A Practical Guide, OSCE, ODIHR, 2009, which contains examples of key 
legislation from across the world. 
9 Policy Paper, ‘Hate Crime Action Plan:  Challenge it, Report it, Stop it’ Home Office, March 2012.  
10 Policy Paper, ‘Hate Crime Action Plan:  Challenge it, Report it, Stop it’ Home Office, March 2012, page 3. 
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this in mind, the Ministry of Justice, as part of a cross-departmental Government initiative on 
hate crime, asked the Law Commission to consider the case for broadening the scope of the 
CDA and POA provisions to bring them into line with the greater range of victims protected 
under the CJA.  The Law Commission published its final report on the matter in May 2013 in a 
report entitled ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current Offences be Extended?’     
This article seeks to assess the Law Commission recommendations.  In the first section a 
summary of the current law will be provided, followed by a brief overview of the 
recommendations.  The subsequent sections will deal with each of the proposals in more detail.  
It will be argued that the review recommended by the Law Commission of the CDA offences 
should be extended to include the entire legislative framework which deals with hate crime.  This 
is because reform in this area has been piecemeal, resulting in a disordered set of laws which do 
not necessarily give effective protection to hate crime victims.  Examining the CDA in isolation 
from the CJA and the POA, will not satisfactorily address the problems with the current 
legislation, and runs the risk of overlooking the importance of assessing these provisions as a 
comprehensive body of hate crime law.    
The Current Law 
The current legislation prohibiting hate crime can be divided into three categories.   
First, there is a set of offences where the hostility forms part of the mens rea and/or actus reus 
of the crime.  Under the CDA11 basic offences such as assault and criminal damage, can be 
aggravated if committed whilst demonstrating hostility to someone’s race or religion,12 or where 
the offence is motivated, or partly motivated, by such hostility.13  The aggravation carries a 
greater maximum punishment than the maximum for the basic offence.     
Secondly, hostility can act as an aggravating factor at the sentencing stage.  Sections 145 and 146 
of the CJA require sentencing judges to consider hostility on the basis of race, religion, disability, 
sexual orientation or transgender identity as an aggravating factor which goes to the seriousness of the 
offence and which can, therefore, attract a higher penalty.  Unlike the aggravated offences, s. 145 
and s. 146 apply to all offences except those covered in the CDA on the basis that hostility is 
already addressed by the aggravated offences, but there remains a problematic co-existence 
between these provisions which will be considered in more detail below.  There are three 
important distinctions to bear in mind between the CDA offences and the enhanced sentencing 
regime under the CJA.  The first is that the CDA allows for a higher maximum sentence if the 
basic offence has been aggravated.  For example, s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 has a maximum imprisonment of five years, which is increased to seven years if aggravated 
under the CDA.  By contrast, the CJA enables the sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence, 
but only within the statutory maximum.  The second distinction is that under the CDA, the fact 
of aggravation will be assessed by a jury at the liability stage, whereas under the CJA the hostility 
                                                          
11 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, sections 28-32. 
12 The aggravated offences initially only applied to race.  Religion was added to the Crime and Disorder Act by the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, section 39. 
13 The basic offences which can be aggravated are:  section 20 and section 47 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, common assault, criminal damage, offences under sections 4, 4A, 5 Public Order Act 1986, and offences 
under sections 2, 2A, 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  
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element will be determined by a judge at the sentencing stage.  The third difference is that with 
the CDA offences, the fact of aggravation will appear on an offender’s criminal record as it 
forms part of the mens rea and actus reus of the offence they have committed, whereas it will 
not appear on the record of an offender whose sentence has been increased because of hostility 
under the CJA.  All three of these distinctions are relevant to the Law Commission’s final 
recommendations. 
Finally, there are the stirring up hatred offences under the POA.14  These offences initially only 
applied to the stirring up of racial hatred and criminalised conduct which was threatening, 
abusive or insulting and which was intended to stir up racial hatred or was likely to stir up racial 
hatred.  These offences have now been extended to religion and sexual orientation15 but in a slightly 
more restricted form so that the conduct must be threatening, and there must be an intention on 
the part of the perpetrator to intend to stir up racial hatred.16   
Although there are other statutes under which ‘hate crime’ can be prosecuted,17 these three sets 
of legislation form the core of the Law Commission’s report.  As can be seen from this brief 
description, there is uneven protection afforded to the different types of characteristic.  
Although the CJA covers all five characteristics (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and 
transgender), the CDA applies only to race and religion, whilst the POA offences protect race, 
religion and sexual orientation.    The unequal treatment of the different victim groups was the 
trigger for the Ministry of Justice’s request to the Law Commission to consider extending the 
POA and CDA to cover all five characteristics.   
 
Overview of the Law Commission’s Recommendations 
Despite the range of debates which surround the issue of hate crime,18 the Law Commission was 
given a very limited remit by the Ministry of Justice.  The brief was to look at two very specific 
issues: 
                                                          
14 Public Order Act 1986 sections 18-23. 
15 The incitement to religious hatred offences were added by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006; and the 
offences relating to sexual orientation were added by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.   
16 There are also provisions which relate to the protection of freedom of expression under certain circumstances 
under POA, section 29J (religion) and section 29JA (sexual orientation). 
17 For example, Communications Act 2003, section 127, Malicious Communications Act 1988, section 1 and the 
Football (Offences) Act 1991, section 3. 
18 A non-exhaustive list of examples of debates within hate crime law:  a) whether hate crime legislation should exist 
- J Jacobs and K Potter, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics (OUP 1998); F Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias 
Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999).  For UK commentators on the same topic see for 
example P Iganski, ed., The Hate Debate:  Should Hate Be Punished as a Crime?  Profile Books Ltd, London, 2002; b) 
what form hate crime law should take - Ivan Hare, ‘Legislating Against Hate – The Legal Response to Bias Crimes’ 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, 17 (3) 415 and Maleiha Malik, ‘“Racist Crime”: Racially Aggravated Offences in 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part II, Modern Law Review, 1999, 62(3), 409-424); c) how the law should be 
interpreted - M Walters, ‘Conceptualizing ‘Hostility’ for Hate Crime Law:  Minding ‘the Minutiae’ when Interpreting 
Section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2014) 34(1), 47-74, K 
Goodall, 'Conceptualising “Racism” in Criminal Law' (2013) 33 LS 215); d) which characteristics of victims should 
be given protection  - Schweppe, J (2012) 'Defining Characteristics and Politicising Victims: A Legal Perspective'. 
Journal of Hate Studies, 10 (1):173-198; N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconptualizing hate crime victimization 
through the lens of vulnerability and ‘difference’’ Theoretical Criminology, 2012 16:499; G Mason, ‘Victim Attributes in 
Hate Crime Law:  Difference and the Politics of Justice’ British Journal of Criminology,  54(2), 161-179; G Mason ‘The 
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a) To consider the extension of the CDA 1998 to include hostility demonstrated towards 
people of disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity; 
b) To consider the case for extension of the stirring up offences under the POA 1986 to 
include stirring up of hatred on the grounds of disability or transgender identity.19 
Thus, it was not within the Law Commission’s terms of reference to consider the rationale for 
the current legislation, or to repeal or amend any details of the law beyond the issue of which 
victims should be included.  However, the Law Commission recognised that the questions set by 
the Ministry of Justice could not be answered without a broader discussion of the context within 
which these offences exist.  As a result, the Law Commission read the brief as expansively as 
possible.  This enabled them to cover a wider range of issues that went beyond the victims of 
hate crime, and thus to produce a better grounded set of recommendations.  In June 2013 an 
initial Consultation Paper was produced which contained a number of proposals and alternative 
proposals which, broadly speaking, advocated the extension of both sets of offences.20  After 
extensive and wide consultation, the final report was published in May 2014 and put forward the 
following recommendations. 
In relation to the first question, the Law Commission concluded that the case for extension of 
the aggravated offences cannot be answered without at the outset considering the effectiveness 
of the enhanced sentencing regime which came under a great deal of criticism from practitioners 
during the initial fact-finding stages of the project.  They made two recommendations in relation 
to the CJA powers:  the first is that the Sentencing Council should issue guidance on the hostility 
element both for the CDA offences and the CJA provisions; and the second is that the use of 
enhanced sentencing should be recorded on the police national computer (PNC) so that when an 
offender’s sentence has been aggravated as a result of hostility, this information will appear on 
their criminal record.21   
The next set of recommendations relate more directly to the first question by focusing on the 
aggravated offences themselves.  In the consultation paper, the Law Commission favoured 
extending the aggravated offences to include sexual orientation, disability and transgender.  
However, the consultation process uncovered a number of problems with the aggravated 
offences which led the Commission to recommend in the final report that, before a decision is 
made about extending the law, a comprehensive review of the aggravated offences should first 
be undertaken.  However, in recognition that this may not be taken up by the Government 
because of the time and cost involved, the Law Commission have taken a pragmatic approach by 
also recommending that if a review is not undertaken, the aggravated offences should be 
extended to include sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity in order to rectify the 
current inequity in the protection of the different characteristics under the existing regime.22  The 
Law Commission also considered the definitions of ‘disability’, ‘sexual orientation’ and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
symbolic purpose of hate crime law: Ideal victims and emotion; Theoretical Criminology, 18(1), 75-92;  M Walters and J 
Tumath 'Gender "Hostility", Rape, and the Hate Crime Paradigm', Modern Law Review, 2014, 77(4), 563-596.  
19 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 2. 
20 ‘Hate Crime:  The Case for Extending the Existing Offences’, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 213, June 
2013. 
21 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Three. 
22 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Four 
and Five. 
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‘transgender identity’ should these new offences be created, and recommended that the current 
definitions used under s. 146 should be used.23    
Insofar as the second question is concerned, having initially been broadly in favour of the 
extension of the stirring up offences to other grounds in the consultation paper, in the final 
report, the Law Commission has reversed its position and recommends instead that there should 
be no change to the POA provisions.  The reason given for this is that there is little or no 
evidence that behaviour of the sort that would be captured by the creation of new offences of 
stirring up hatred against disability or transgender is in fact occurring or is not already covered 
under other legislation.24       
In the following sections, each of the above proposals will be analysed in more detail. 
 
The Enhanced Sentencing Regime  
Although reform of the sentencing provisions under s. 145 and s. 146 of the CJA 2003 was not 
directly within the terms of reference set by the Ministry of Justice, the Law Commission took 
the view that it could not properly consider the case for extension of the aggravated offences 
without also examining the enhanced sentencing regime.  This was a reasonable course to take 
given the technical issues which arise from the relationship between the CJA sentencing powers 
and the aggravated offences, but also because the Commission’s own fact-finding discussion 
preceding the Consultation Paper revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the inadequate use of 
the sentencing powers by judges.  The underlying premise of the assessment of the CJA was to 
explore whether the enhanced sentencing regime could provide an adequate alternative to 
extension of the aggravated offences.  The two recommendations made in relation to the 
enhanced sentencing regime were aimed at improving the CJA powers so that the main benefits 
which currently flow from the aggravated offences could be transposed to the enhanced 
sentencing regime, and thus obviate the need to extend the CDA provisions.   
a) Sentencing Council Guidelines  
In exploring the problems with the current sentencing regime, the report identified the lack of 
guidance on the interpretation of the hostility element and its application as an aggravating 
factor, as a particular cause for concern25.  This was because the absence of clear guidance has 
led to inconsistent decisions being reached by sentencing judges, and also to what consultees 
perceived to be the imposition of unduly lenient sentences.26  In combination, these factors have 
undermined the success of the regime and have weakened confidence in its effectiveness.  The 
first proposal, therefore, is to recommend that the Sentencing Council produce new guidelines 
                                                          
23 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Six. 
24 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Seven. 
25 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 56, 
paragraph 3.13. 
26 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 57, 
paragraphs 3.16-3.17. 
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on the element of hostility in order to clarify areas of uncertainty.27  In the original consultation 
paper, this proposal had been limited to the enhanced sentencing regime powers, but in the final 
report, it was suggested that the guidance should also be applied to sentencing of the aggravated 
offences as well.   
At the consultation stage, the proposal in its more limited form met with solid support28 and this 
is likely to also be the case with the more extended version.  However, some may question 
whether clearer guidance will necessarily lead to an increased use of the enhanced sentencing 
powers.   More importantly, whilst guidance is clearly necessary in this area, it is less clear what 
principles the Sentencing Council should use to determine the content of their advice.  The 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the hostility element mirror a deeper lack of consensus 
about the appropriate use of the term in the aggravated offences which has led some judges to 
be reluctant to find an offender guilty in cases where the hostility is incidental to the commission 
of the offence.29  This is a practical manifestation of a much wider principled debate about what 
hostility should mean, and is an example of the unease felt by some that law allows the 
prosecution of offenders who use racist language casually, without malice.30  The creation of any 
guidelines will, therefore, be less straightforward than the Law Commission suggests.  It is 
important to note that the issues of principle which lie at the heart of the question about the 
definition of hostility are identified later on in the report but only in relation to the aggravated 
offences, even though it is clear that they apply equally to the enhanced sentencing regime.  
Given that the Law Commission recommends a broader review of the aggravated offences 
which would examine these questions, it would be unfortunate if the Sentencing Council 
published advice that ran counter to the conclusions reached in the review.  As such, it would be 
preferable if the question of sentencing guidelines forms part of, and is informed by, this broader 
review rather than be generated separately from it.  This is a good illustration of why it is 
important to consider the different pieces of legislation as a comprehensive body of hate crime.  
Persisting with incremental law reform of each provision separately without regard for 
developments in the other areas will exacerbate the existing problems of inconsistency and 
ineffectiveness. 
b)    Enhanced Sentencing and recording on the PNC 
The next recommendation in relation to the enhanced sentencing regime is concerned with the 
labelling of offending behaviour.  Currently, if an offender is convicted of an aggravated offence, 
this will appear on his or her criminal record.  However, if an offender is convicted of an offence 
                                                          
27 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 64, 
paragraph 3.49. 
28 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 58, 
paragraph 3.20. 
29 M Walters, ‘Conceptualizing ‘Hostility’ for Hate Crime Law:  Minding ‘the Minutiae’ when Interpreting Section 
28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2014) 34(1), 47-74.  See also D 
Ormerod, ‘Public order:  respondent using word “Paki” once during incident lasting about half an hour’, Criminal 
Law Review, 2009, 6, 449-452. 
30 B Dixon and D Gadd, 'Getting the Message? “New” Labour and the Criminalization of “Hate”' (2006) 6 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 309 and D Gadd, 'Aggravating Racism and Elusive Motivation' (2009) 49 Brit J 
Criminology 755, D Ormerod, ‘Public order:  respondent using word “Paki” once during incident lasting about half 
an hour’, Criminal Law Review, 2009, 6, 449-452. 
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to which s. 145 or s. 146 is applied at the sentencing stage, the fact of aggravation is not recorded 
on the PNC.  This means that the aggravated offences provide an obvious advantage in terms of 
‘labelling’ as the hostility element of an offender’s conduct is officially recorded, whereas it is not 
under the CJA.  The Law Commission proposes to remove this discrepancy by recommending 
that in all cases where s. 145 or s. 146 is applied, the aggravation should automatically be 
recorded on the PNC.31  The benefit of such a system, the Report argues, is that this information 
will be useful to criminal justice agencies such as the police, courts, probation service and prison 
service.32  It will also mean that the aggravation will appear whenever a Disclosure and Barring 
Services criminal records check is made, thus ensuring that ‘hostile’ offenders are not able to 
work in jobs where this hostility could be an issue.33      
The Commission reports that this proposal met with ‘overwhelming support’34 from consultees 
who agreed that this improvement in information sharing would help with matters such as 
safeguarding, rehabilitation, detection, investigation and sentencing.  Undoubtedly, inclusion of 
hostility on the PNC will bear many of the advantages outlined in the report35 such as giving 
agencies greater knowledge of an offender’s past behaviour, and providing employer’s with 
information they find useful.  However, this recommendation needs to be treated with an 
element of caution as there are important points of principle and practice which must be 
considered before the PNC is extended in this way.   
Insofar as the recording of the aggravation is concerned, it should be noted that including 
information about the aggravation at sentencing would be a novel use of the PNC, and as such, 
necessitates careful thought about whether labelling an offender in this way is appropriate.  A 
particular issue in this regard is the fact that unlike the CDA where the aggravation is determined 
at the liability stage under trial conditions and often by a jury, under the CJA, the aggravation is 
decided at the sentencing stage by a judge, after guilt has been established to the criminal 
standard of proof at trial.  There may, therefore, be a point of principle to be explored here 
about the suitability of labelling at the sentencing stage as offenders are not given the same 
opportunity to defend themselves as they are at trial. The report does allude to this potential 
issue by making it clear that if aggravation is to be assessed at the sentencing stage, then an 
offender should be given notice of this in order to give them time to prepare their case, and a 
Newton hearing should take place which will give the offender many of the protections he or she 
would get during a trial.  However, although this suggestion would go some way towards 
ensuring offenders are given ample opportunity to defend themselves against any accusations of 
hostility at the sentencing stage, this still does not deal with the deeper point of principle 
involved in mixing the fundamentally different functions of the liability and sentencing stage.  
The liability stage involves the scrutiny of the defendant’s conduct and mental state under strict 
                                                          
31 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 74, 
paragraph 3.104. 
32 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 72, 
paragraphs 3.90 – 3.94. 
33 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 72, 
paragraph 3.93. 
34 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 66, 
paragraph 3.57.   
35 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, pages 66-69, 
paragraphs 3.59-3.77.   
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procedures in order to determine whether that behaviour falls under a particular criminal label; 
sentencing, on the other hand, is the point at which the level of punishment is determined.  
Imposing a label on the offender at the sentencing stage as the Law Commission is proposing, is 
a prima facie subversion of this central difference, and therefore must be explored in greater 
depth before this recommendation is implemented.   
Even if a good case could be put forward for overriding any principled concerns with including 
the fact of aggravation on the PNC for use by the police and other criminal justice agencies, 
there may be objections to allowing this information to be available to employers.  The report 
draws attention to serious questions currently being asked about the types of information which 
can be accessed by employers through a criminal records check.36  In Re T, the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the blanket inclusion of all conviction information in the Criminal Records Certificates 
(CRCs) and Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ESRC)37 was incompatible with Article 8 
rights.  Since the decision in Re T in 2013, the Government has introduced a filtering system 
which excludes information if it is a person’s only conviction, the sentence imposed was non-
custodial or it was more than 11 years old.38  Re T is currently on appeal with the Supreme Court, 
but irrespective of the outcome of that case, it is clear that there are wider concerns in relation to 
the information that should be made available to employers because of the implications this may 
have for offender’s ability to gain employment and re-integrate successfully into society after 
they have served their sentence.  The issue requires a complex balance to be struck between the 
needs of the offender and that of society more generally.  The report seems to assume that the 
availability of such information would be useful to employers without also considering what 
repercussions this may have for offenders.   
There are other broader issues that also need to be examined before the Government decides 
whether to implement the recommendation on the PNC.  First, it is necessary to consider 
whether the stigmatisation of offenders through their criminal records is the most appropriate 
way of dealing with perpetrators of hate crime.  Criminologists are circumspect about the net-
widening effect that such labelling has, and the negative impact it has on crime reduction.39 
There is also a practical concern here.  If inclusion on the PNC becomes mandatory, sentencing 
judges may become more cautious about attaching a hostility element in their sentencing 
decisions because of the awareness that this will have serious implications for the offender’s 
criminal record.  The current structure of the CJA compounds this problem as the hostility 
element is wide and can be established in cases which consist of no more than an offhand 
comment made during the course of committing another offence.40  If the matter is dealt with at 
sentencing, without the additional aggravation appearing on the offender’s record, a sentencing 
judge can capture the different levels of hostility in the level of punishment he or she imposes.  
                                                          
36 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, pages 50-52, 
paragraphs 2.117-2.120. 
37 As per Part V of the Police Act 1997. 
38 R (T) v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2013] EWCA Civ 25, [2013] 1 WLR 2515, [38]. 
39 See for example S Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification (Polity Press 1985). 
40 There is an increasing awareness that the breadth of the hostility element in the CDA has caused some judges and 
magistrates to be reluctant to find hostility in such cases:  see M A Walters, ‘Conceptualizing ‘Hostility’ for Hate 
Crime Law:  Minding ‘the Minutiae’ when Interpreting Section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, (2014) 34(1), 47-74, D Ormerod, ‘Public order:  respondent using word “Paki” once during 
incident lasting about half an hour’, Criminal Law Review, 2009, 6, 449-452. 
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However, these nuances will be lost if the aggravation is simply included on the PNC, and might, 
therefore, deter sentencing judges from considering the hostility because of the high stakes 
involved for the offender.  There are, therefore, a number of factors that need to be assessed in 
much more depth before a decision can be made to include the fact of aggravation on the PNC, 
and it is suggested that the recommendation of the Law Commission is not taken up without a 
broader examination of these issues.   
A final matter of concern is that the report has not discussed how inclusion on the PNC will 
affect the aggravated offences.  This is another example of the report focussing on the different 
pieces of legislation separately rather than treating them as an interconnected corpus of hate 
crime law.  The report suggests that the recommendation regarding the PNC should be 
implemented whether or not the aggravated offences are extended.41  However, part of the 
rationale for including aggravation on the PNC was to strengthen the CJA powers in order to 
make them an effective alternative to the CDA offences.  If this is the case, then it does not 
make sense to consider the PNC recommendation in isolation from the discussion on the 
aggravated offences as the two are obviously linked.  This becomes obvious when we consider 
what would happen if both the PNC recommendation were implemented and the aggravated 
offences were extended (both would be possible under the Law Commission’s proposals).  If 
this were to take place, this would effectively render the CDA provisions obsolete, as there 
would be very little motivation for the prosecution to charge the aggravated offences as the CJA 
powers would allow for virtually the same result, but without the need to prove the aggravation 
during a trial.  The only circumstances under which the prosecution might prefer the CDA 
charge is where a higher maximum sentence is sought, but as they Law Commission points out, 
in practice it is very rare for sentencing judges to impose sentences for the aggravated offences 
that go above the maximum for the basic offence.42  This observation is of significance as it 
further demonstrates the importance of considering any reform of the CDA and CJA together 
and not in isolation from each other.  The Law Commission’s central recommendation is that 
the CDA provisions undergo a thorough review, however, it is suggested that this review should 
also be extended to the CJA in order to ensure that an integrated approach is taken in any 
proposed reforms to either area of the law.     
Thus, although the recommendation in relation to the CJA powers might be of value, it requires 
further reflection.  More thought needs to be given to whether labelling at the sentencing stage is 
appropriate in principle but also whether inclusion of aggravation on the PNC will genuinely lead 
to a higher use of hate crime powers by judges.  This recommendation also needs to be 
scrutinised in the broader context of other hate crime laws in order to ensure a cohesive 
approach to law reform is adopted.   
 
Aggravated Offences 
                                                          
41 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 74, 
paragraph 3.105. 
42 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 109, 
paragraphs 4.122. 
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The next set of recommendations relates to the aggravated offences.  One of the reform options 
in the Consultation Paper was to extend the CDA offences to sexual orientation, disability and 
transgender in order to bring them in line with the characteristics protected under the CJA.43  
However, in the final Report, the Law Commission is more cautious about endorsing such an 
extension and their primary recommendation is that a comprehensive review of the aggravated 
offences is required before any change in the law is advocated. 44  Although the report puts 
forward a strong argument for a wider review it recognises that further review will be costly in 
terms of time and money, and concedes that this may dissuade the Government from this 
undertaking.  If this is the case, they recommend as a second option that in the interests of 
equality, the aggravated offences should be extended to sexuality, transgender and disability.45  
They do, however, point out that this would be a ‘less valuable’46 route as the aggravated 
offences in their current state are not able to deal effectively with the problem of hate crime. 
There were two main issues that swayed the Law Commission against immediate extension and 
towards wider review.  The first was the belief that many of the practical benefits that consultees 
suggested would occur as a result of the extension of the aggravated offences were not only 
speculative, but also could be achieved in other ways, such as through the enhanced sentencing 
regime.  An example of this is the belief that the symbolic, communicative and ‘fair labelling’ 
functions of the aggravated offences could be achieved equally well through a reform of the 
enhanced sentencing regime as per their first recommendation (namely inclusion of aggravation 
at the sentencing stage on the PNC).47   
The second, and arguably the most important reason against immediate extension was the fact 
that the consultation process brought to light a number of problems with the current structure 
and practical working of the aggravated offences which undermined their effectiveness.  The 
unduly complex nature of the offences which allow for either the demonstration of hostility or 
the motivation of hostility was causing problems in practice for prosecutors, and was resulting in 
plea-bargaining, or the dropping or downgrading of aggravation charges.48  In many cases, it has 
also led to the aggravated charges not being brought in the first place as they are deemed too 
difficult to prosecute.49  This means that the aggravated offences are not being used effectively, 
and therefore are not achieving the purposes for which they were enacted.   
The Law Commission also highlighted important areas of principle which need to be analysed 
further.50  For example, currently, there is no theoretical framework for deciding which 
                                                          
43 ‘Hate Crime:  The Case for Extending the Existing Offences’, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 213, June 
2013, Chapter Three. 
44 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Five. 
45 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 151, 
paragraphs 5.105. 
46 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 126, 
paragraph 4.203. 
47 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 100-101, 
paragraphs 4.86-4.88. 
48 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 117-119, 
paragraphs 4.159-4.167 and pages 120- 122, paragraphs – 4.173 -4.185. 
49 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 117-119, 
paragraphs 4.159-4.167 and pages 120- 122, paragraphs – 4.173 -4.185. 
50 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, pages 135- 145, 
paragraphs 5.36 – 5.81 
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characteristic should be included within hate crime legislation.  This is something that requires 
greater thought, and needs to be linked to the underlying justification for hate crimes.  There is 
also the broader question of whether it is more appropriate to deal with hate crime at the liability 
stage or the sentencing stage, and whether we can continue with the current system that tries to 
do both.  Another area that was emphasised in the report was that of the limited nature of the 
basic offences which underpin the aggravated offences.  These basic offences do not necessarily 
cover the most prevalent offences sustained by victims of hate crime on the basis of sexual 
orientation, transgender identity and disability.  For example, sexual offences are often 
perpetrated against victims of sexual orientation hate crime, but sexual offences are not basic 
offences for the purposes of the CDA. 51  Furthermore, many hate crimes are now committed 
over the internet, but the offences that would capture such behaviour such as the Malicious 
Communications Act 1998 and the Communications Act 2003, are not included in the list of 
basic offences.      
These are all good reasons why a comprehensive examination of the aggravated offences is 
necessary, although there will be many who might disappointed with this recommendation as it 
will inevitably delay any reform of the law.52  However, it will also ensure that any changes that 
are made to the legislation are not purely symbolic, but will generate a set of provisions that are 
able to provide efficient and effective protection to the victims of hate crime.  Proceeding with 
extension of the aggravated offences without such a review would ignore the problems with the 
existing regime and would, therefore, be unlikely to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing hate 
crime.  It is also important to note that this broader review of the aggravated offences is not 
intended as an opportunity to re-open entirely the debate about whether targeted legislation to 
combat hate crime should exist.53  Rather, what is proposed is a consideration of the most 
effective way of dealing with hate crime.  Thus, the suggestion for wider review is something that 
should be welcomed by hate crime proponents because it is the best long-term option for 
victims of hate crime, even if in the shorter term reform will happen at a slower pace.   
Thus far, it has been suggested that the Law Commission has responded appropriately to the 
range of issues.  However, there is one concern that should be highlighted and given greater 
prominence than is currently the case in the report, and this is the so-called mutual exclusivity 
issue.  Currently, the s. 145 duty to include aggravation for race and religion as part of sentencing 
applies to all offences except where a CDA offence has been prosecuted.  Thus s. 145 and the 
CDA provisions are mutually exclusive in order to ensure there is no double-counting of the 
aggravation.  Mutual exclusivity has also been taken to apply in situations where a CDA offence 
was prosecuted but was not ultimately successful,54 or was withdrawn from the indictment,55 so 
as to comply with the general sentencing principle that an offender should not be sentenced as 
though they have committed an offence for which they have been found not guilty. However, 
                                                          
51 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 117-119, 
paragraphs 4.159-4.167 and page 122, paragraph 4.187. 
52 A large number of consultees were in favour of immediate extension (115 out of 134 people who responded) 
‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 81, 
paragraph 4.5. 
53 The parameters of the wider review are set out in ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law 
Commission (no. 348), May 2014, Chapter Five. 
54 McGillivray [2005] EWCA Crim 604, [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 60. 
55 Kentsch [2005] EWCA Crim 2851. 
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there is some dispute as to whether this mutual exclusivity should also apply in cases where an 
offender is being sentenced for a basic underlying offence, but where the CDA version was not 
charged at all.  The Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines (MCSG) and CPS guidance have 
adopted the view that mutual exclusivity should extend this far, thus s.145 should not be used in 
cases involving the non-aggravated versions of the basic offences under the CDA.  However, 
Taylor56 has suggested that this interpretation of the law is wrong and the case of O’Callaghan57 
which deals with this point should be read to mean that s. 145 should apply to the non-
aggravated versions of basic offences as long as the defence is given notice that aggravation will 
be taken into account at sentencing, and the offender is given the opportunity to argue his or her 
case in a Newton hearing.  The Law Commission appear to agree with Taylor on this point.58 
However, there is an inherent problem with the existing regime whereby aggravation can occur 
both at the liability stage and the sentencing stage because whichever of the two readings of the 
law is adopted, the very existence of two alternative regimes undermines the ability of the law to 
deal effectively with hate crime.  If we take Taylor and the Law Commission’s view that s. 145 
and the non-aggravated basic offences are not mutually exclusive, this effectively undermines the 
CDA because it means there is little incentive for prosecutors to charge the harder to prove 
aggravated offences when they can reach virtually the same result by prosecuting a basic offence 
and proving aggravation at the sentencing stage using the CJA.59  One of the only reasons the 
prosecution might have for opting for a CDA offence in such circumstances is in order to make 
use of the higher maximum penalty for the aggravated offences; however, given that it is rare for 
sentencers of the aggravated offences to go beyond the maximum for the underlying basic 
offence,60 there is little motivation to do so.  If, on the other hand, we adopt the MCSG and CPS 
view which takes a much broader view of mutually exclusive, then this leads to the paradoxical 
result that whenever a hostility issue arises in relation to a non-aggravated version of a CDA 
offence, this has to be proven at the liability stage with the accompanying difficulties this entails, 
whilst if hostility occurs during an offence not covered by the CDA, then this only needs to be 
proven at the sentencing stage.  Thus either interpretation of the mutual exclusivity issue has 
unfortunate results given that the point of the CDA was to create offences that would allow 
prosecutors to punish hate crime offenders more effectively.  This raises questions about the 
efficacy of the mixed approach and suggests that serious thought has to be given to which 
approach is preferable.61  This also reinforces the need for the wider review proposed by the Law 
Commission to include a broader more holistic examination of how hate crime laws hang 
together rather than considering the different regimes in isolation. 
                                                          
56 Richard Taylor, “The role of aggravated offences in combating hate crime, 15 years after the CDA 1998 – time for 
a change?” (2014) 13 Contemporary Issues in Law 76. 
57 O’Callaghan [2005] EWCA Crim 317, [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 514. 
58 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, pages 36-57, 
paragraph 2.70. 
59 There would be even less incentive if the Law Commission’s recommendation that the fact of aggravation appear 
on an offender’s record were implemented.  A similar point was made above in the section on the PNC proposal. 
60 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 109, 
paragraphs 4.122. 
61 R Taylor provides a number of reasons why the sentencing option might be preferable in his article “The role of 
aggravated offences in combating hate crime, 15 years after the CDA 1998 – time for a change?” (2014) 13 
Contemporary Issues in Law 76. 
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Overall, the proposal for a wider review is to be welcomed.  There is the fear that the Law 
Commission undermined its own recommendation by giving the Government a much easier 
alternative proposal to extend the CDA offences, but the Law Commission’s rationale for 
suggesting both is understandable from a pragmatic point of view.  However, it is very clear that 
the CDA provisions, and their inter-relationship with the CJA are problematic, and if the 
Government opts for a ‘quick win’ by extending the aggravated offences, it runs the risk of 
missing the opportunity to reform a legal regime that currently does not enjoy the confidence of 
practitioners and which is not achieving favourable outcomes for the victims of hate crime.   
 
Stirring Up Offences 
The final recommendation in the report relates to the stirring up offences found in the POA.  
Currently, the stirring up offences apply to race, religion and sexual orientation, and the question 
put to the Law Commission by the Ministry of Justice was whether protection should also be 
extended to transgender and disability.  In the Consultation Paper, the Law Commission had 
provisionally recommended extending the law on the basis that there was a principled case in 
favour of doing so.62  This finding was reiterated in the final report where the Law Commission 
examined factors such as the effect on freedom of expression, the Equality Act 2010, the issue of 
parity between characteristics, and the symbolic importance of such an extension and any 
deterrent effects it may have.63  However, one of the key questions put to consultees in the 
Consultation Paper was whether there was also a practical need for extension.  The Law 
Commission concluded, from the examples provided by consultees, that there was little or no 
evidence of a practical need to reform the POA.  This was because the sorts of behaviour that 
consultees suggested might be covered by the new offences were either not strong enough to 
reach the high threshold required under the stirring up provisions, or were already covered by 
other offences such as section 4 or 5 of the POA or the Serious Offences Act 2007.  
Consequently, the Law Commission determined that the stirring up offences should not be 
extended to transgender and disability.     
The Law Commission was right to frame its discussion within the wider question about the 
practical need for the creation of new provisions because the principle of minimal criminalisation 
requires that any new laws must be ‘absolutely necessary’.64  However, given that the existing 
stirring up offences in relation to race, religion and sexual orientation are rarely successfully 
prosecuted because of the high threshold that needs to be passed,65 it was no surprise that the 
consultation process did not elicit a vast array of examples of behaviour that would be covered if 
the provisions were extended to transgender and disability.  A more useful approach would have 
been to question how effective the current POA offences are at outlawing harmful hate speech.  
This would have been particularly pertinent given that the consultation process itself highlighted 
                                                          
62 ‘Hate Crime:  The Case for Extending the Existing Offences’, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 213, June 
2013, Chapter Four. 
63 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, pages 171 – 
192, paragraphs 7.9 – 7.102. 
64 A Ashworth and J Horder, Principle of Criminal Law, (OUP, 2013), Chapter One. 
65 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 193, 
paragraph 7.107. 
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some of the gaps in the current legislation on hate speech.  In the report, it is noted that 
consultees contended that much of the harmful behaviour experienced by victims of hate crime 
occurs over the internet, but existing laws are insufficient to combat all manifestations of such 
hate speech.66  Although the stirring up offences can deal with instances where an offender has 
deliberately incited hatred in others,67 and offences such as the Malicious Communications Act 
1998 and the Communications Act 2003 are aimed at cases where hostility has been targeted at a 
particular individual, neither of these sets of offences prevent the harm that may be caused to 
those who read hate-filled material on the internet, regardless of whether they belong to the 
target group.  Discussions about whether and what type of hate speech should be prohibited is a 
matter of immense academic debate, not least because of the freedom of expression issues which 
arise.68  However, it is a debate that has not been resolved, and particular attention needs to be 
paid to online hate speech.  Jeremy Waldron has put forward an argument in favour of the 
prohibition of hate speech on the basis that it poisons the environment in which we live and 
generates fear and insecurity in target groups.69  In relation to internet hate speech in particular, 
Perry and Olsson have argued that the dissemination of hate on the internet reinforces the 
legitimacy of racist groups and spreads the problem to a wider group of people.70  Both Waldron 
and Perry and Olsson’s articulation of the harm caused by hate speech do not fall into the 
traditional categories of harm as encompassed by the POA or the other offences.  This is not the 
place to discuss these issues in detail, but it does demonstrate that it is necessary to explore the 
arguments in favour of expanding the law to cover such harm, and suggests that there may be a 
need to reconceptualise the wrong that is caused by this particular type of hate speech.  
Moreover, the Ministry of Justice is currently investigating the most effective ways of combatting 
hate over the internet,71 and it is suggested that this should take place within the context of a 
wider review of hate crime more generally rather than concentrating on piecemeal reform outside 
a broader framework. 
A further problem with the analysis of the stirring up offences is the fact that the outcome of the 
discussion is based on the discrete approach adopted by the Law Commission in relation to hate 
crime offences, rather than on an overall examination of the available statutory regime.  
Although the decision not to extend the stirring up offences seems inevitable given the lack of 
examples provided by consultees, it is nevertheless surprising that the Law Commission placed 
so little weight on the need to provide equal protection to all five characteristics, particularly 
insomuch as the need for equality of treatment played such a prominent role in their decision 
                                                          
66 ‘Hate Crime:  Should the Current offences be Extended?’, Law Commission (no. 348), May 2014, page 197, 
paragraphs 7.126 and page 199, paragraph 7.132. 
67 Or was likely to, in the case of race. 
68 See the following for arguments made by UK academics against and in favour of an incitement to religious/racial 
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69 J Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, (Harvard University Press, 2012). 
70 B Perry and Pa Olsson ‘Cyberhate: the globalization of hate’ Information & Communications Technology Law, Volume 
18, No 2, 2009, 185-199. 
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about the aggravated offences.72  The reason the Law Commission gives for the discrepancy is 
that the aggravated offences and the enhanced sentencing regime form part of a single scheme 
and so it is important that they give equal protection to the different characteristics; the stirring 
up offences, on the other hand, are a separate regime enacted for very different purposes, and so 
the need for parity with the other offences is not as strong.73  However, there are problems with 
this reasoning.   
To begin with, the arguments in favour of parity could be said to be weaker in relation to the 
aggravated offences and enhanced sentencing given that Parliament explicitly refused to extend 
the aggravated offences to sexual orientation, disability and transgender when they extended s. 
145 power to these characteristics under s.146.  The Law Commission are right to point out that 
Parliament’s reasoning on this point is weak given that there is no principled or practical reason 
given for why race and religion should be treated differently.  However, this still means that 
using the ‘single scheme’ argument does not make sense as it demonstrates that the Law 
Commission’s argument for considering the stirring up offences separately on the basis of when 
the offences were enacted is not conclusive of the matter as we need to go further and ask 
whether the law is sound.    
Furthermore, the question of whether or not the two schemes should be considered separately 
requires further thought.  Whilst it is true that the aggravated offences and the stirring up 
offences were enacted at different times and for different purposes, the underlying core of both 
is how to deal with hatred or hostility against certain groups in society.  They do this in different 
ways – the aggravated offences deal with harm caused to individuals, whereas the POA 
provisions are concerned with the stirring up of hatred against groups – but fundamentally they 
have a shared aim.  Admittedly these offences have developed separately from each other, but 
the same can be said of the CDA provisions and the enhanced sentencing regime which the Law 
Commission regard as a ‘single scheme’.  In fact, the differences between the offences are a 
result of the haphazard fashion in which these laws have developed, rather than the result of a 
well-thought out strategy by Parliament.  This demonstrates that there has been a conspicuous 
absence of a systematic analysis and assessment of these provisions as a coherent body of ‘hate 
crime’ law.  By treating the stirring up offences as a separate scheme, the report compounds this 
problem.  This discussion confirms what has been argued earlier about the need to examine how 
these offences interact with each other in order to judge whether together they combine to form 
an effective response to hate crime.  Therefore, it is argued that the wider review recommended 
in relation to the aggravated offences also needs to include the POA provisions.   
In summary, the Law Commission’s analysis of the POA offences occurred within a very narrow 
frame of reference.  Although this was in part a result of the limited brief assigned to them by 
the Ministry of Justice, it would have been possible to broaden out the discussion by 
emphasising the problems with the operation of the current law in much the same way as 
occurred with the examination of the aggravated offences.  The apparent rarity of prosecutions 
of the POA offences along with the Law Commission’s own observations about the proliferation 
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of internet hate speech are factors that could have been emphasised more to underline the 
shortcomings of the POA offences.  This is a matter which has already been highlighted by 
academics, but this would have been a good opportunity to discuss it at greater length in order to 
reach an effective response to the issue of hate speech.74   
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the report on hate crime has been very carefully considered, and it is clear that the Law 
Commission has been meticulous in its efforts to consult widely.  It has reflected thoroughly on 
the responses generated by the consultation process, and it has made a concerted effort to come 
up with a set of proposals that strike a balance between on the one hand keeping within the very 
narrow terms of reference set by the Ministry of Justice, and on the other recognising the need 
to take a wider and more principled approach to the question of law reform.  The proposals, 
therefore, represent an attempt to combine both principle and pragmatism by examining the 
issue in a thoughtful manner, but also to generate proposals that are likely to result in reform that 
will act as an effective solution to the problem of hate crime.   
However, there are problems with the recommendations.  The creation of guidelines on the 
hostility issue by the Sentencing Council cannot be undertaken separately from the wider review 
on the aggravated offences.  The recommendation to include the fact of aggravation on the 
Police National Computer is potentially more complicated and controversial than the Law 
Commission’s report implies, and thus requires further debate.  The problem of the inter-
relationship with the CDA and CJA powers, along with the apparent gap in the law in relation to 
hate speech (particularly in relation to conduct perpetrated over the internet), raises the wider 
question of whether the legislation forms a coherent body of hate crime law.  Finally, the POA 
recommendation did not take account of the effectiveness of the stirring up offences, and nor 
did it give sufficient regard to the need to consider the POA alongside the CDA and CJA 
powers.  All these issues indicate that the wider review recommended by the Law Commission 
needs to go further than the aggravated offences, and needs to include a more wide-ranging 
examination of the existing legislation in order to determine its overall effectiveness at 
combatting hate crime.   
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